Protecting Blockchain

Protecting Blockchain

Protecting Blockchain

Protecting Blockchain

Protecting Blockchain

Protecting Blockchain

Crypto

Crypto

Crypto

Jul 09, 2025

web3 scam
web3 scam
web3 scam

Sometime last week, headlines burst with news that over 250,300 USDT (worth around ₦460 million) had been stolen via a fake donation drive linked to the Trump 2025 inauguration. A fake domain, an urgent message, a familiar name — and just like that, the crypto left the donor’s wallet.

But what really got people talking — at least on this side of the Atlantic — was that a portion of the funds was traced to a Binance wallet registered in Nigeria.

Now, before we go any further, I must say this:

This piece is not a takedown of a crime. It’s a thought experiment. A look at what the scammers could have done — if they were smarter — and why Nigeria remains one of the easiest places on Earth to be a ghost in the digital world.

It’s me trying to make sense of the question that has been on my mind: What if Nigeria has happened to the blockchain transactions?

Big Name. Foreign Scandal. Same Old Story

The playbook was classic. Impersonate someone important, make it sound urgent, and get the money moving before questions are asked. In this case, the scammers reportedly used a domain like t47lnaugural.com — one letter off from the real thing — to impersonate Trump inauguration insiders. They sent out emails, probably with official-looking signatures and polite forcefulness, asking for crypto donations. And it worked. A single transfer of 250,300 USDT — that’s over ₦460 million — landed in their wallet.

Now here’s where it gets even more Nigerian. That wallet, freshly created just a few months before, was linked to a Binance account with Lagos-based activity. But if you know Lagos, you know that means little. Lagos is a ghost town in broad daylight. I’ve met people living in shared rooms with ten phones and twenty SIMs — none in their names.

So, the mere fact that the wallet was used in Lagos doesn’t really mean the scammer lives in Lagos or even is Nigerian (yes, that’s very possible).

Heck! It doesn’t even mean the person listed on Binance is real.


Beloved Nigeria: A Case of Too Many Names, Not Enough Identity

When it comes to fraud detection and prevention, identity management systems play a vital role. For Nigeria, it’s not a case of a lack of ID systems but one of too many systems. BVN for your bank. NIN for government records. Voter’s card. International passport. Even your SIM is supposed to be registered.

The country just deploys an alphabetic soup of identification systems with each one designed to enhance security and accountability, yet their fragmented implementation has created the very vulnerabilities that enable large-scale fraud.

Once, a person sent me his two different bank accounts — one with his actual name, the other with a different name. Both worked. No issues. And when I was having network issues in Taraba and needed alternative SIM cards, someone offered me two already registered lines instead — all functional, no paperwork. That’s our normal. It’s not just a Nigerian thing. One time in Ghana, I was having issues with transactions and buying data and when I explained to the Uber driver, he surprisingly was willing to give me one of his many SIM cards in exchange for some cedis. He even showed me how to transact mobile money with it. Of course I was pleased, but imagine if I was willing to pay a little extra simply for him to help me sign up on some crypto wallet. Now imagine if Ehiremen Aigbokhan — the Nigerian man named in connection with the scam — was also like that Uber driver.

We’re living in a country where you can sign up for wallets with borrowed BVNs, register fintech apps with half-complete details, and vanish when things get too hot. A dream environment for frauds like this.


But Crypto Didn’t Start the Fraud. It Just Made It Easier.

Crypto was supposed to liberate us. And it has, in some ways. But it’s also given fraudsters new weapons. Non-custodial wallets? No ID needed. Just download, backup a seed phrase, and you’re live. Custodial platforms like Binance may ask for KYC, but when the name on the passport and the address on the utility bill don’t really match — who’s checking?

According to reports, the wallet used in this scam was created in October 2024, a few months before the crime was perpetrated in December 2024. Besides, there had been no prior deposits into it up until after the crime. That tells you something. This wasn’t a tool someone built over time. It was disposable. Made for a single job. And, although the FBI was able to trace and recover $40,300 from the wallet, in principle, it worked.

Nigerians are among the most active crypto users globally. But while awareness is high, understanding is often low. People know how to send and receive but they don’t always know that crypto can’t be reversed, or that a fake website can empty your wallet in seconds. This makes many Nigerians not just victims — but often tools, unknowingly helping criminals wash money.


The Real Exploit Was Never the Code

At its core, blockchain is one of the most secure digital systems in existence. It is decentralized, immutable, and protected by cryptographic protocols that make tampering virtually impossible.

While in theory, this makes the blockchain an ideal foundation for secure transactions, especially in regions with fragile institutions; in the case of the ₦460 million inauguration scam, it reveals a vulnerability that cannot be seen by a smart contract auditor — a vulnerability in the people.

Fraudsters didn’t need to hack smart contracts or exploit technical bugs. They simply relied on age-old social engineering tactics — trust, urgency, manipulation — to convince a donor to send funds voluntarily. And this may be why again Ehiremen Aigbokhan might not even be the true architect. He could be a fall guy. A proxy. Or even a fake identity. In a country where documents are bendable and accountability is a moving target, it’s not far-fetched to question whether the name tied to the account is the person truly behind the scheme. The person behind the keyboard was the real attack vector.

This human element is especially fragile in markets like Nigeria, where there’s a growing awareness of cryptocurrency as a financial lifeline, but often a shallow understanding of how it works beneath the surface. High awareness without deep understanding creates the perfect storm: people are quick to engage with crypto but slow to grasp its risks.

Compounding this is the ease with which fraudsters recruit or deceive everyday Nigerians into becoming money mules — creating wallets, verifying accounts, and unknowingly facilitating scams. These individuals may believe they’re helping with a legitimate business or opportunity, when in fact they are part of a laundering network.

So while blockchain offers transparency and traceability, it can only go so far. If the systems that onboard people — ID infrastructure, mobile registration, digital literacy — are weak, then the entire ecosystem remains exposed. The chain may be strong, but the people holding it up are not.

This isn’t just a story about a scam that has put Nigeria on the wrong side of global fame or a confirmation of how fraudulent the Nigerian youth has become. It’s a story about ghosts — ghosts who walk through the gaps in our systems wearing borrowed names and fake addresses, using tools meant to empower, to exploit.

The 250,300 USDT wasn’t stolen by brute force. It was sent — because someone believed a lie. And that lie found space to grow in a system where names are plenty but identity is fluid.

If Nigeria wants to harness the real power of blockchain, it must first fix the people part of the chain. Clean up identity systems. Align BVN with NIN. Make sure every wallet, every SIM, every bank account can be traced not just to a name, but to a real, living, breathing human. Not just on paper, but in practice.

Blockchain doesn’t fail us. But when Nigeria happens to the blockchain and we fail to secure the door before letting people onto the chain, we might have such stories of the Ehiremen Aigbokhans — real or not — pulling off crimes that many would have thought unthinkable.

The future is digital. But if we want it to work for us, we have to stop being ghosts. And start being accountable.

©

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2025

Designed & Developed by Daniel Abayomi

©

|

2025

Designed & Developed by Daniel Abayomi

©

|

2025

Designed & Developed by Daniel Abayomi